I'm Siming Ye, a Ph.D. candidate in Economics at Georgetown University. I am a microeconomic theorist studying how information, constraints, and social comparison shape individual and collective decisions. My work combines decision theory, social learning, and social choice. I am on the 2026-2027 job market.

I plan to attend CICE in Beijing on December 12–13, 2026, and the ASSA Annual Meeting on January 3–5, 2027. I would be happy to meet at either event.

Publications

Haves and have-nots: A theory of economic sufficientarianism, with Christopher P. Chambers, Journal of Economic Theory, 2024

This paper develops axiomatic foundations for sufficientarian social welfare in multidimensional allocation problems. We characterize a sufficientarian criterion using sufficientarian judgment, symmetry, and separability, and relate the resulting ordering to leximin.

Job Market Paper

Aspiration-Weighted Influence

I model a consumer whose stochastic choices depend on the observed purchases of an external agent, the influencer. Some of the goods purchased by the influencer are unavailable to the consumer. These observed purchases provide the source of variation in the model. I develop a model with a baseline distribution for the consumer's choices in the absence of influence and a single influence parameter. Under additional conditions across menus, the baseline has a Luce representation. I behaviorally characterize the model and establish when variation in the influencer's purchases identifies the consumer's choice probabilities in the absence of influence and the influence parameter. The model predicts that the consumer responds more strongly to changes in the influencer's choices among available goods when these goods account for a larger share of the influencer's purchases.

Working Papers

Incentivizing Work to Be Reviewed (Draft)

I study how organizations should reward work that is subsequently used and revised by others. An analyst’s effort improves the accuracy of an initial assessment. A reviewer combines a noisy observation of that assessment with independent information to make the final decision. The organization chooses the analyst’s compensation and acquires costly records to evaluate her work. I characterize optimal wages and record acquisition. Better information for the reviewer can improve final decisions while increasing the cost of inducing the analyst’s effort.

An earlier draft of this project circulated as “Washed Out by the Crowd? Accountability under Sequential Review.” Earlier draft · July 2026

Retire Him, Deploy Her: Couples’ Asymmetric Labor Responses to Pension Eligibility, with Lanfeng Li (Draft)

We examine how couples respond to pension eligibility in developing countries by focusing on the rural Chinese pension system. Using data from the China Health and Retirement Longitudinal Study, we employ a double regression discontinuity design to capture the sharp changes in eligibility at age 60. Our findings reveal a striking pattern that contrasts with developed nations: women increase their labor force participation when their husbands become pension-eligible, while men decrease their participation when their wives reach eligibility age. To explain these asymmetric responses, we extend collective household models to incorporate three key mechanisms: income effects from pension receipt, intra-household labor substitution, and age-based constraints on market access. The evidence supports an Added Worker Effect that persists even after spouses reach pension eligibility. We believe this brings policy insights into pension systems in developing countries with weak social safety nets.

Lanfeng’s job market paper. SSRN

Work in Progress

Teaching

Instructor

Ph.D. Math Camp

Teaching Assistant

  • Undergraduate Intermediate Microeconomics (ECON 2101)  ·  Game Theory (ECON 4059)  ·  Decision-Making in Economics and Finance (ECON 4453)

  • Master’s Decision and Game Theory (ECON 5607)

  • Ph.D. Microeconomics II (ECON 6002)  ·  Math for Economics (ECON 6011)